This executive order recites that some large defense contractors underperform on existing contracts and pursue newer, more lucrative contracts, stock buybacks and excessive dividends to shareholders at the cost of production capacity, innovation and on-time delivery. Consequently, the executive order places restrictions on stock buybacks and dividends by contractors who are underperforming or who have insufficient prioritization, investment or production speed. The executive order sets up a process for the secretary of war to: (a) identify and determine contractors who are underperforming; (b) give notice of underperformance to those contractors; and (c) provide the contractor with an opportunity to submit a remediation plan. The executive order also directs the secretary of war to take steps to ensure that future contracts with new or existing contractors prohibit both stock buybacks and corporate distributions by the contractor during any period of underperformance, noncompliance or insufficient prioritization of the contract or insufficient investment or production speed. Future contracts are to stipulate that executive incentive compensation will not be tied to short-term financial metrics such as free cash flow or earnings-per-share driven by stock buybacks and instead will be linked to on-time delivery, increased production and necessary facilitation of investments and operating improvements required to expand stockpiles and capabilities. Executive base salaries in future contracts are also to be tied to these metrics.